Russell Daylight, What if Derrida Was Wrong About Saussure? by Altamirano, Marco
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XX, No 1 (2012)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.545 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 
University of Pittsburgh Press 
 
Book Review 
Russell Daylight, What if Derrida Was Wrong About 
Saussure? (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2012), 224 pp. 
Marco Altamirano 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie française et de 
langue française, Vol XX, No 1 (2012) pp 147-152.  
Vol XX, No 1 (2012) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.545 
www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XX, No 1 (2012)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.545 
Book Review 
Russell Daylight, What if Derrida Was Wrong About 
Saussure? (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 
224 pp. 
The short answer to the question posed as the title of Daylight’s book is: 
“Yes, Derrida was wrong about Saussure, in many ways.” Daylight spends 
the majority of his book counting them, the most salient of which are 
interrelated: (1) Derrida identifies Saussure’s phonocentrism as a 
logocentrism too hastily by imputing Husserl’s primordial intuition, or pre-
expressive substratum of sense, to Saussure’s mere privileging of the voice 
over writing; (2) Derrida claims that Saussure employs a transcendental 
signified, a static referent independent of signifiers, when Saussure’s Course 
repeatedly states that there is no signified without a signifier, thus 
dismantling the possibility for such a transcendental signified, whether real 
or ideal; (3) Derrida misconstrues Saussure’s terms by casting them within a 
metaphysics of presence, thus forcing Saussure into a mold amenable to his 
broad critique of classical metaphysics. Now, while Daylight’s book is 
mainly critical, he concludes it on a positive note that he promises in the 
beginning of the book, namely, that “the act of resisting Derrida’s reading of 
Saussure opens up rich possibilities in linguistic and political thought” (18). 
The result is a penetrating book of interest to scholars across fields as diverse 
as linguistics, cultural studies, comparative literature, and philosophy. In 
summary fashion, I will begin this review by outlining Daylight’s informed 
and careful arguments against Derrida’s influential but uncharacteristically 
incautious appraisal of Saussure, and conclude by considering the “rich 
possibilities” that his book reveals.  
Daylight begins his book, appropriately, with a discussion of Derrida’s 
characterization of “classical semiology” as a discipline belonging to the 
tradition of the metaphysics of presence. Classical semiology considers the 
sign as something that “takes the place of the thing in its absence” (19). 
Spoken words are understood as signs that “take the place of” what they 
refer to, or their referent, in the absence thereof. Written words would thus 
be “signs of signs,” in the sense that in the absence of a spoken word, the 
written word can “take its place.” This is a tradition extending back to 
Aristotle’s analysis of language in On Interpretation: 
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Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written 
words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not 
the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but 
the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the 
same for all. (Aristotle, De Interpretatione: 16a, 2-4; cited in Daylight, 
20).  
Here, the phonic symbol is the first-order symbol of mental experience, and 
the written symbol is a second-order symbol, and thus speech is said to have 
a proximity to mental experiences, which Derrida comprehends as an 
“immediate relation” or “absolute proximity” to being. Although the 
mention of Aristotle in a discussion of semiology might seem anachronistic 
to some readers, in the sense that the Aristotelian world in which sumbolon 
has its meaning might seem a far cry from the world in which the terms 
sign, signifier, and signified operate, Daylight seems to appreciate Derrida’s 
effort in Of Grammatology to reveal the “relationship between classical 
metaphysics and the concept of the sign” (21). Daylight proceeds to note that 
in Aristotle both spoken and written words are conventional, and so their 
“proximity” to being is problematized. In other words, for Daylight, the 
precise relation that obtains between spoken words and being in Aristotle is 
not sufficiently demonstrated by Derrida’s notion of “absolute proximity.” 
This is important because for Derrida logocentrism is at once 
phonocentrism: “absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the 
meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning” (Of Grammatology, 
11-12; cited in Daylight, 21).  Daylight, however, aims to separate 
phonocentrism, which he defines as “the privilege of speech over writing,” 
and logocentrism, which he defines as “the belief in mental experience 
without the need for language,” in order to ask whether or not Saussure 
might be phonocentric without being logocentric.  
The feature that allows Derrida to delimit a period of philosophy from 
Aristotle to Hegel and even to Husserl by the term “classical metaphysics” is 
the “concept of the sign.” This sign is a concept that polarizes two terms, the 
word and the thing, the signifier and the signified (although it is mentioned 
that the thing can be real or ideal, material or mental, following the mental 
orientation of Saussurean linguistics, Daylight’s book examines chiefly 
signified ideas). For Derrida, the employment of the concept of the sign 
implies a logocentrism because the signified pole is intelligible, which is to 
say, accessible only within the logos. Derrida identifies such a logocentrism 
in Husserl in what he finds to be a “pre-expressive substratum of sense” or a 
“primordial intuition,” an intelligible field that does not require the 
intermediary of a signifier. Daylight then notes that Derrida seems to 
implicitly use Saussure as a critical power when advancing a semiological 
critique upon Husserl’s pre-expressive field of mental life. For Derrida, 
mental life itself consists of representations, and so a system of signs is 
brought to bear upon Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of consciousness. 
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Saussure is shown to be a critical force in Derrida’s analysis because, as 
Daylight shows, for Saussure there are no pre-linguistic ideas, and so he 
dismantles the conception of language as posterior to ideas. For Saussure, 
there is a determining reciprocity between the signifier and the signified that 
must be taken seriously. However, as Daylight forcefully argues, this is 
precisely what Derrida fails to seriously apprehend.  
This oversight in Derrida’s engagement with Saussure is identified by 
Daylight as a neglect to consider Saussure’s theory of value: “Saussure calls 
language “a system of pure values,” in which meanings only have solidity, 
or reality, in relation with other meanings, and in a relationship with sound” 
(39). That is to say, for Saussure language is a system of differences where 
each linguistic item comes to have meaning in relation with other linguistic 
items, so that there is no extra-linguistic support for language; rather, 
language is understood as the process that first creates meanings 
differentially. But this means that there is no stable referent to which 
language adheres. Although Saussure privileges speech over writing in the 
sense that he understands writing to simply be a second-order signifier for 
spoken signifiers, it does not follow that his phonocentrism entails a 
logocentrism because there is no intelligible signified that is independent of 
signifiers, which is simply to reiterate that signifiers are always in 
determinate reciprocity with what they signify. Daylight acknowledges 
Derrida’s critique of phonocentrism in classical metaphysics:  
The exclusion of writing is not an accident of history, but rather a 
necessary preliminary condition for metaphysics if it is to allow the 
self-present voice – or the mental, unspoken, experiential, internal 
voice – an immediate and pre-linguistic relationship with nature, 
truth, and the logos (64).  
Thus, the logocentric voice provides metaphysical access to truth. But this 
view of an interior voice connected to meaning relies on a notion of 
consciousness as the site of intelligibility that is plainly not Saussure’s, if 
only because (1) signifiers and signifieds are mutually determinate, and (2) 
the author of Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-
européenes understood the evolution of language as not simply contained 
within consciousness but rather as enjoying a wider social and political 
environment, and thus intelligibility itself changes alongside this wider site 
of language evolution.   
Although it is clear for Derrida that the concept of the sign implies a 
pre-expressive substratum of sense, whether it be mental experience in 
Aristotle or the primordial intuition of Husserl, it is less clear for Daylight 
that the same applies to Saussure. If signifiers and signifieds are 
codetermining or codependent, then language and thought are too 
intimately bound to accept Derrida’s hasty identification of phonocentrism 
and logocentrism in Saussure. Moreover, the field of language for Saussure 
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is profoundly social, it is constituted by a community of language users, 
whereas for Husserl the individual voice of consciousness is the 
handmaiden of thought. Thus, Daylight is able to conclude that “Saussurean 
speech is not the phenomenological voice” (84).  In Saussure, there is no 
“transcendental signified” that is independent of signifiers, which could 
serve as a ground for signifiers. Linguistic value emerges from a differential 
system where the units of language are not positive but rather the products 
of differences. Thus, value replaces identity in Saussure, and as such, there is 
no identifiable ground, no extra-linguistic or transcendental signified that is 
required by Saussurean linguistics. Consequently, Saussure, in Daylight’s 
close reading, already exceeds the classical tradition within which Derrida 
attempts to capture him. Finally, it is only by neglecting Saussure’s theory of 
value that Derrida is able to misconstrue Saussure’s semiological 
terminology into the structure of the phenomenological voice in Husserl, 
thus forcing Saussure into a mold amenable to his broad critique of classical 
metaphysics.   
To be fair, however, once Daylight acknowledges that Saussure is 
phonocentric, a reader of Derrida might have trouble understanding how 
Saussure escapes the Derridean criticism that spoken and written signs are 
constituted in a play of differential relations (in the sense that writing would 
not be a derivative of speech). In other words, Derrida’s criticism that 
spoken words are themselves a sort of inscription, in that the spoken word 
and the written word share the structure of writing because they both 
facilitate a discursive articulation that constitutes the order of things without 
reference to pre-given signified, would seem to remain applicable to 
Saussure. Although, as Daylight carefully shows, Saussure makes certain 
statements that would seem to limit the extent of Derrida’s criticism, it may 
continue to be the case that Saussure relies on a conceptual framework that 
exceeds the limitations prescribed by those statements. In a passage in Of 
Grammatology that I do not recall seeing in Daylight’s book, Derrida writes 
that “it is when he is not expressly dealing with writing, when he feels he 
has closed the parentheses on that subject, that Saussure opens the field of a 
general grammatology” (Of Grammatology, 43). Not only does this reveal a 
Derrida much more admiring and complementary to Saussure than 
Daylight’s portrayal, but it also serves as an indication of Derrida’s more 
general philosophical posture as attempting to demonstrate that an author’s 
discourse commits him to certain positions that he is attempting to break 
from. In this fashion, Saussure’s depreciation of writing might inadvertently 
reveal a power of writing behind speech itself.   
In order to consider the Saussurean resources that Daylight’s book 
reinvigorates through his restitution of Saussure from Derrida’s cavalier 
treatment, it seems appropriate at this point to provide a few remarks on 
what might be called the “style” of his book. “What if Derrida was wrong 
about Saussure?” occupies a mixed genre, somewhere in between 
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comparative literature and the legal case, in the sense that Daylight attempts 
to vigilantly argue against Derridean slanders in order to recover the real 
Saussure. He accomplishes this by cataloguing Derrida’s comments on and 
allusions to Saussure and mounting evidence either for or against, but 
mainly against, Derrida’s reading. The verdict is that Derrida was at least 
negligent, if not deliberately obfuscating, in the case of Saussure, which at 
times is presented as a symptom of an anxiety of influence (Derrida 
dismisses entire facets of Saussure’s originality, misconstrues his system, 
and even curiously fails to mention Saussure while employing a very 
Saussurean maneuver). And so the book sometimes seems to betray a sort of 
philosophical idolatry endemic to its genre of scholarship, which seeks to 
represent an original Saussure over and against his illegitimate 
appropriation by Derrida. I mention all of this only because the most 
interesting aspect of this book to me, as a reader not invested in either of the 
figures, defendant or prosecutor, is that the final depiction of Saussure 
seems to be at odds with the testimony provided in the book. Allow me to 
explain.  
The chief resource in Saussure that resists the Derridean project is 
elaborated in terms of origin, antecedence, and the transcendental signified 
of presence and consciousness that Derrida imputes to Saussure. Daylight 
writes: 
Each term in Saussurean theory…requires, presupposes, and 
delineates the others in a system of pure values, and hence each 
term of Saussurean linguistics is caught up within the linguistic 
field which it announces…I have asked, what if the conditions of 
the linguistic system did not precede, were not antecedent to, the 
linguistic system? What would that mean? (167).  
That is to say, if there is no transcendental signified in Saussure, would not 
Saussure have anticipated the Derridean project of comprehending a 
language system as a play of differences without antecedent conditions? 
Derrida maintains that it is the very concept of the sign, with its essential 
poles of a signifier and signified, that classifies Saussure within a 
metaphysical logocentric tradition, but he at once maintains that the sign 
facilitated a new theory of discourse, “a system in which the central 
signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present 
outside of a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental 
signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely” (SS&P: 
280; cited in Daylight, 167).  From the Derridean elimination of the signified, 
from the endorsement of signifiers only signifying other signifiers, Daylight 
shows that Derrida’s appraisal of Saussure is “equivocal” or two-sided, 
which comes from the double-position of the sign itself – as a halfway house 
between metaphysics of presence and the dismantling of that tradition, half 
jurist-priest and half demonic-rogue. By showing that meaning was not 
constituted by any essence or transcendental referent, but rather by a system 
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of differences without any positive item, Saussure went against the 
metaphysical, logocentric concept of the sign.  
But Derrida found a residual classicism in Saussure because his 
semiological system required a center, namely, the consciousness of the 
language user, holding the system together from a position beyond the play 
of differences. Nonetheless, the Saussurean sign, by virtue of its differential 
function, afforded him the possibility to think beyond this center, toward an 
a-centered pure play of differences. Daylight argues that for Saussure, “there 
can be no “category of the subject” or “concept of the sign” or “primordial 
difference”; these entities do no exist” (169). But what, then, are we to make 
of his restitution of Saussure from Derrida’s perversion? That is to say, the 
testimony of Daylight’s book aims to restore an original, pure, signified 
Saussure (with his synchronic system of language) from Derrida’s salacious 
appropriation; however, the final depiction of Saussure as a theorist who 
begins with a differential system of language seems to be at odds with the 
motivation of the book to restore Saussure, if simply because such a 
restoration is precluded by Daylight’s own reading of Saussure’s system. 
That is to say, if taking Saussure seriously requires us to admit that the word 
never stays the same in virtue of the fact that value is determined by 
differential relations within an ever-changing system of language, what 
Saussure “means” is precisely what is beyond restitution, and can only be 
re-evaluated by figures like Derrida who have, in fact, mobilized a change in 
the linguistic system of differences. Of course, Daylight could respond, in a 
similar turn, that his signifiers are contributing to the continual re-
evaluation of Saussure in order to reconfigure the language system so that 
the figure of Saussure would mean something else, but in doing so would he 
not at once undermine his published project? In the final analysis, have the 
“rich possibilities” that Daylight opened by resisting Derrida resolved 
themselves in a dismantling of the conditions for the possibility of his own 
testimony?  
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